

# Flare Network

## Smart Contract Audit

coinspect





Flare

## Smart Contract Audit

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V230328

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### 1. Executive Summary

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FLR-6 Reward burner can be reconfigured to send funds to arbitrary account

FLR-7 priceDeviationThresholdBIPS can't adapt to market conditions

FLR-8 totalSelfDestructWithdrawnWei variable is never updated

FLR-9 Inflation annum tests not passing

### 5. Disclaimer

### 6. About Coinspect

## 1. Executive Summary

In July 2021, [Flare Network](#) engaged [Coinspect](#) to perform a source code review of the Flare Network smart contracts.

The objective of the project was to evaluate the security of the smart contracts that implement critical functionality in the network, including but not limited to:

- Flare Daemon
- Inflation and Supply
- Flare Time Series Oracles and Price Providers whitelisting
- Vote Power Token and delegation mechanism

In February 2022, Flare engaged [Coinspect](#) to perform a second source code review of the **Flare Network platform**. This latest audit focused on the incremental changes performed to the platform since Coinspect's previous review.

Overall, Coinspect observed Flare smart contract's code, documentation, and test suite quality to be above average. The code follows smart contract security best practices. All the reviewed components had clear specifications and the code was extensively documented with commentaries explaining relevant decisions and assumptions. Several unit and integration tests are included in the repository and result in excellent code coverage.

Coinspect found no issues that could result in user funds being at risk. Some informational level findings are reported as suggestions to further improve the platform.

In March 2022, [Coinspect](#) performed a Fix Review of the **Flare Network platform**, to reevaluate the security of the smart contracts in scope.

No issues were identified during the assessment:

High Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk
Open <b>0</b>	Open <b>0</b>	Open <b>0</b>
Fixed 0	Fixed 0	Fixed 0
Reported 0	Reported 0	Reported 0

The engagement focused on the platform's smart contracts and their correctness with respect to the specifications. The design of the platform's crypto economic incentives and related assumptions were not reviewed as they depend on the interaction with other components which are not yet finished and were not part of this engagement. The Flare Network's consensus layer and Governance model were not evaluated either.

## 2. Assessment and Scope

The latest audit started on **January 24, 2022** and was conducted on two branches of the GitLab repository located at [gitlab.com/flarenetwork/flare-smart-contracts/](https://gitlab.com/flarenetwork/flare-smart-contracts/).

The first branch reviewed was [coinspect\\_audit2\\_branch1](#), which included the changes for the Songbird candidate release. The last commit reviewed during the engagement was `e3fa5c15421707b3bc85327b3442e856d2ba5e60` of **January 24, 2022**:

```
commit e3fa5c15421707b3bc85327b3442e856d2ba5e60
Merge: 9d8c9c1 9e0a422
Author: Ilan Doron <ilan@flare.network>
Date: Mon Jan 24 09:20:23 2022 +0000

    Merge branch 'songbird-candidate' into 'coinspect_audit2_branch1'

    remove some outdated docs

    See merge request flarenetwork/flare-smart-contracts!423
```

The second branch reviewed was [coinspect\\_audit2\\_branch2](#), which included the changes introduced for the Flare candidate release. The last commit reviewed during the engagement was `f774e1d2ac90634feb6f12c303793db41bb4a419` of **February 8, 2022**:

```
commit f774e1d2ac90634feb6f12c303793db41bb4a419
Merge: 5792771 43f57b8
Author: Ilan Doron <ilan@flare.network>
Date: Tue Feb 8 17:00:29 2022 +0000

    Merge branch 'master' into 'coinspect_audit2_branch2'

    update from master to coinspect audit 2 branch.

    See merge request flarenetwork/flare-smart-contracts!445
```

The scope of the audit was limited to the following Solidity source files, shown here with their sha256sum hash corresponding to the second branch reviewed:

```

bf4e539e6ec09b9d9472efa79923b4a7d7232cc5f119206c74d52d6ae841dccf ./tokenPools/implementation/FtsoRewardManager.sol
68e536215e580bc0073a401087a09f0921f2a75c9c62e7295ca1803cf31506f1 ./tokenPools/implementation/UnearnedRewardBurner.sol
a0e52c0e5cc716c4aa158b2d0b6d9d48726858139f847228faa38f6d9c3366f3 ./tokenPools/implementation/Distribution.sol
8cea4c20f387577b2ce18c134cf8520b3e022184f33c84eb7cf54084919e937 ./tokenPools/interface/IITokenPool.sol
239b1a4cea7f3097af27803b9abdd97d26bd5bf126abbcee2f2b9e6e2610888c ./tokenPools/interface/IIFtsoRewardManager.sol
ea8a2ae0d3a5355929103d1006bd9e33bc361b5c6193e3b5749448383c4ad53 ./mockXAsset/mock/AssetToken.sol
a74a32cc14ad2134c626485068e5c76b3071bc5057ced810a966757745bfe329 ./mockXAsset/mock/DummyAssetMinter.sol
e048e4b7718b3070b7bce54987b84330318703286ddd0c79d7ab738515eac52f ./mockXAsset/interface/ICollateralizable.sol
aea5d38cb92435e56b8601b5f3fd7bee5062da993feebd249c71b9bb6481f1a8 ./genesis/mock/InfiniteLoopMock.sol
6b40d53e3dfbc29c43aa039797d59f61773b4ace0053c3f800157bab8ce808a0 ./genesis/mock/FlareDaemonMock.sol
26b79fc0cfe5056ba4008f0536b01525aacd414c6dbcabc429163b7b3de375 ./genesis/mock/TestableFlareDaemon.sol
debdeba7884368523c7022e3e73731cf5aa5e53f24c76163b692a3eb5a5e99 ./genesis/mock/FiniteLoopMock.sol
711f9844fc81676a95d498c1d6497cd125fa6627ba98dc52ce987add9577900 ./genesis/mock/FlareDaemonMock1.sol
6a0183517977afac120b627432f8dfc6d8b5eb2be17d312ef791c2d3b803908e9 ./genesis/mock/ReadGasLeft.sol
2060606587d0518f3397e3b0d7aa582b1c0eb4bbdf7b64cc2e339bab61d2ccb ./genesis/mock/EndlessLoopMock.sol
3f0cc4a73ff5cba07c18186a9cb44558e348f5a43d243facd8a96b706e1b34d0 ./genesis/mock/FlareDaemonMock2.sol
3f6eff7ec1ab34756f26e822a7c17eb24578a35ac2c2baf0e13b9e438e20db0 ./genesis/mock/InfiniteLoopMock1.sol
3ad83e36cf28d87b6e5f606f520665ff228d1c9132c7ee2072fb22de443c1278 ./genesis/implementation/StateConnector.sol
296270f8983befd1d8234e8675ce33f7eb9489b578c5c5d1fbdbab541fd20045 ./genesis/implementation/PriceSubmitter.sol
953732bfa7eaed316ed77eaf1fccaa167eaa65e10c75248ee52eb37350b22cea ./genesis/implementation/FlareDaemon.sol
435152b27625dcb1564bb275e819e11d65f540d183361a04061406aeaef19f00 ./genesis/interface/IFtsoRegistryGenesis.sol
90cac97dd9882b6f77e4a1a90dd9a812c10d8266b41c6287a8d4285d6cad0314 ./genesis/interface/IIInflationGenesis.sol
4352cd4e2d3644b5ba19b261a6b0c65d804dc0f4fe2c64910c5aa88ffc358430 ./genesis/interface/IIPriceSubmitter.sol
cca145c8c6770699574f7db27662f1d76eb33d6b54a0315fdc396fae4747c76 ./genesis/interface/IFlareDaemonize.sol
06a7b4f3c2b67af0a92094f6e53ced08da3f8abadd3859f1e1bfcf8e70fe8c05 ./genesis/interface/IFtsoGenesis.sol
907c5c8b95ff8dccdd8572c63654716fe9f1d626df43520f1a5995bbd388019f ./genesis/interface/IFtsoManagerGenesis.sol
888dee1a4d362fc820f154f56116dec520f0b23e126942f52813a32aa790811 ./addressUpdater/mock/AddressUpdatableMock.sol
fb74132581784ebcd120221c5478b26dd915bb0a5707856cc52bf50412d1770 ./addressUpdater/implementation/AddressUpdater.sol
6cf01dd4544e028cd562bb0cc9dc1f1c350b9ae2fc6dc3d96b3afdf28f20fd95 ./addressUpdater/implementation/AddressUpdatable.sol
59824abf5524c24e54c161f1faeed77763eab397b4eb7d02304291fbc63d4abc ./addressUpdater/interface/IIAddressUpdatable.sol
f1b03df0e5b8863aed1cb97c5b0e7bef51837713c14f18b4a64e3974f01ccbe ./governance/mock/HistoryCleanerMock.sol
fb582ea6980b1adb4d78ebf6a83e5a522e68fa990f961fedaa28291dfca6fea5a ./governance/implementation/GovernedBase.sol
93cf605f3233de4520b4e27474677166106690aa8e2563e135d598720356700 ./governance/implementation/Governed.sol
e0d147fb7158a7a866ccae28bca80296f032dc8db1e9fc40e8262a725a8bc7eb ./governance/implementation/GovernedAtGenesis.sol
4d30ff003e16b3a625fdb20ecc39965771ff9efdf8e3a3a0edb87f14be80b4344 ./userInterfaces/IFtso.sol
22b2f694b7fb7eb2fd447785b74343346a77003edb9db6fdaa2ea79932debf4 ./userInterfaces/IVPContractEvents.sol
fd3111ed7c7baa101d4bb85eb79e05469c6ad20355f66149b15a2935002b44cb7 ./userInterfaces/IPriceSubmitter.sol
bddea7532299880f0a76e9067266d4fa18477826096326c7c1bf448e84c6a0b4 ./userInterfaces/IWNat.sol
b850523a4bf8173ca747030b4db8a9118ef2992a7264f6abbbf509623c0aa13c ./userInterfaces/IVPToken.sol
39e3e7de96bc794f830dadcc2c2086ad9aeac1d1e886934679d7cc3d315f95c ./userInterfaces/IDistribution.sol
482aaa07addf41346e3996b31edd592c7cba28b95e0f0ebd0ebeefae79b8f8ed ./userInterfaces/IFtsoRegistry.sol
6cb0ad319bf05b26a4cf846273cdb2394c83241612bfad5fb742cab19cba1578 ./userInterfaces/IGovernanceVotePower.sol
9f80875e92cb3067aab251ad746136b3e3f55c5fa9f129643132fb487196b35 ./userInterfaces/IFtsoRewardManager.sol
43d8624273b06f2ef77a277b5ad98b1c3fe7ae89edff6c627711a26e4b2b94074 ./userInterfaces/IFtsoManager.sol
eaa082812a3486b88dd4cbc25c1ead80f0d3993dfa7c4c2669c0842c49245d9 ./userInterfaces/IVoterWhitelister.sol
27235ab0ac08281c05f39130bf12ad8237cd5850fee2fd64fbfa200b673e876 ./inflation/mock/InflationReceiverMock.sol
c251acd5490b7e08e5fdedd0ae2ab4fab0905645a0455f2407af85e55c00896d ./inflation/mock/InflationMock.sol
5e17fe844f3db062e3bfa397254ba17b6cc6e56f5d6b3462073941b671a9e4a ./inflation/mock/PercentageProviderMock.sol
483d4d4e050ebcfd4dfbcc04a9e20a0a7fdfa287d920c986a128713d4727af9af ./inflation/mock/SuicidalMock.sol
04b20a9bf8e179038d98d15711f1cb37c9292e5aff538f8d2022c40af8511a52 ./inflation/mock/InflationMock1.sol
77e4fd4021fae07fa17b34b026293f2ce76d6e076c665bbf25d7dc22b3c646f0 ./inflation/mock/FlareDaemonWithInflationMock.sol
234730acd6c7a35fb1d69672c164c6d6360e738544dfdd8f21e7b254266a91c3 ./inflation/mock/InflationReceiverAndTokenPoolMock.sol
f63c5c572d823d6c978b875f99cb2156bbc0080f113ff94aaebaf97048c7c95a ./inflation/implementation/Inflation.sol
d9f68dbb03cbad352829cd72519076618a56c6d777c1f7b2949420bbc36edcbc ./inflation/implementation/Supply.sol
40dda7efa90cd1b1d8f813205b718b9bdb8d0e9057375dff37a1ef7db580f4 ./inflation/implementation/InflationAllocation.sol
3b37472beb05518c1cde004da4133afeb4272c07e31d8db317f13416c78dbc ./inflation/lib/InflationAnnum.sol
d0df108753a5d4aa4351266a547f2db3ea27019ac9a18034db58f443c167cf9 ./inflation/lib/InflationAnums.sol
942dd3f1315811deb28deb14dfdaf47225e396733bc99b3391f4e240f5d7e3d2 ./inflation/lib/RewardServices.sol
b87a9d8f63b2ef7cdf0d507339d6f2a6497378a84940269f8156d24597adec71 ./inflation/lib/RewardService.sol
a29709dcdb968b1d91cfba5e354eb8f54314668e834de300dc69a5187bf9b15 ./inflation/interface/IIIInflationAllocation.sol
92f6f58dd0c54c6b1ac5c45a0e24479acf65673b21f3ebc142f68ff3a3ebe9ad ./inflation/interface/IISupply.sol

```

```

093ce091266460e8f4d4682c3d235ae63ae20590dd3f1fdf052ee03c752586ac ./inflation/interface/IIInflationReceiver.sol
1f19fc317f93cadaaf8937db4fc61aa17f4949694e7cec9a7ab958278c31733 ./inflation/interface/IIInflationPercentageProvider.sol
32a518978197b162f36bbcee446200d6424e126c8077b93ee9c7ace449a7ad0d ./inflation/interface/IIIInflationSharingPercentageProvider.sol
b13a5fe247a4b80022cbeb5a63f371de391f3a6da8947476075d7a7c95abf8d9 ./utils/mock/PriceSubmitterUnregisterHack.sol
8987b038958572bbd87aae862ac2ec3770aa158037aa1ff4523767b3bf1691af ./utils/mock/SafePctMock.sol
ef603d230385fbefec6d97312a1f2e9d73beed653564e04ccb942b1f3b6fc1c ./utils/mock/VoterWhitelisterMock.sol
6945f0b2926288db2a94f7c91fd30fec36f57337423853b47c5f825099cd3dc ./utils/mock/GasConsumer3.sol
6da309494640bd043d894407fce4c7dae1948fc289a8b66afac5e2587d027cc ./utils/mock/GasConsumer.sol
e2e45ea0659ab4b848ba5fb9f79c99d519db95da524901232cdd96670ea3c616 ./utils/mock/GasConsumer5.sol
ec1a3852a028d30cc2e8ff18206110b46fcc1ee1f345a7e512e28f0696c94baa ./utils/mock/GasConsumer7.sol
83d6848fc51feec6b3165f7f2917d74eb3dc19b7ea32262b13d7c2322edc5ef ./utils/mock/GasConsumer2.sol
f90c7c91a6c17c2fa1a5821671fd21e5fb303a79721709fcfd70ff88591d849b ./utils/mock/GasConsumer6.sol
0ea9b26b1502d7507ed8a9dde625718d24b3830749d80c71a077393541e01fc ./utils/mock/DateTimeLibraryContractMock.sol
746379c2cc2e3ba2856c7798edab6e4f802030cdal4e4dbf4ac55b04d4b30d ./utils/mock/GasConsumer4.sol
0aa255d92f4f87c1d4ad4066574e08bfd9350dd0352f6188d9680ee0c072458b ./utils/implementation/PriceReader.sol
c3fd3d454ce3d09c90c22c58631febdb2e5b17499e2c269775f393d5675a59e7 ./utils/implementation/VoterWhitelister.sol
2c134d5f194559ad9e4087297b6d669a22c20c7f76aa9f93bde833e262682795c ./utils/implementation/RevertErrorTracking.sol
da7d13381925ca655b5b184d651f0a5af86a7146b4bf5b8735c64a51bc51bb68 ./utils/implementation/DateTimeLibrary.sol
0dacb948c6a6011d0493f9e8992cadf098080bb6d577363dfdad85562cf542bf ./utils/implementation/SafePct.sol
bce891791f2cf868f98158ee333e41c53df1lebb138c661dac836472386c56512 ./utils/implementation/FtsoRegistry.sol
a81c7e3cbda4eb930d004f48745a7030c35a694fd78579b416c31d8f6f7d43ef ./utils/implementation/GovernedAndFlareDaemonized.sol
3617f640c89459b1f020fbcof6f4adc0e2c574735970af0586b651618661ac4 ./utils/Imports.sol
37c6eafdf11bcb296df58c3234410ca75617aa61906b188d43c73db8230d4b0 ./utils/interface/IIVoterWhitelister.sol
d7971865bc3504135040b25015c8204e41ca8d3ed4209e096dd21e9f7458b04f ./utils/interface/IIFtsoRegistry.sol
61ef59581eafc0270928c91317ebaf15f911e7c07ce34c8ec72594692c9a0ee3 ./ftso/mock/FtsoMedianMock.sol
933d960e83ec96fffa01ca049ce6785023eебдад3db880f8016eb25020f223f3 ./ftso/mock/MockFtso.sol
1245adac9a228015d4a6dadd6c999cd26e978874593eb08b85163da4abba88ea ./ftso/mock/FtsoManagerMock.sol
5f813d421bc347975d69feb95a924a49d828e95839b8d0110061e7a96a42834e ./ftso/mock/MockVPToken.sol
9b17cd3231747b5994aeb0c4df08f2768bc1f201d62d62398525d8c05b0514b8 ./ftso/mock/FtsoEpochMock.sol
85cdadf066db0ba9aabc79672c918d064907c5573f6b3b5fc0437aec81264 ./ftso/mock/FtsoManagerV1Mock.sol
e57aff43aeb20daf18ccae832c0bdb2d40dc838d46d7e7943a0e4f1d2fbba47 ./ftso/mock/SimpleMockFtso.sol
e6c05d055ccbebcba1038124f1d1e29b19fe737d1f5842e5a52f8a36a6433be7 ./ftso/mock/FtsoVoteMock.sol
5067e9001be2fb8e3c18aa7c5ff0b0efea84c74bdfbc887926d4606b723eebd ./ftso/implementation/Ftso.sol
6569e950d567c5bbf820776331ad87db07720bda42bacd40c899eadf474cc994 ./ftso/implementation/FtsoManager.sol
5518904b8925acf0b93b46b5fdab5b29578fd2987d27f3de9d6b21813ba068d2d ./ftso/priceProviderMockContracts/PriceProviderMockContracts.sol
27aa11517762ff22077443b1b8d76eb617ee123f720b409d192f75e654094afe ./ftso/priceProviderMockContracts/priceProviderMockFtso.sol
6147dd29e7b0ad02bb1351020d9fbcc0d79b6091f948b43f8a7c4c132a03ba51 ./ftso/lib/FtsoVote.sol
5fe21742a36e432bcdc6329240e86821439c7cc2360f80722d3495d967539cd ./ftso/lib/FtsoMedian.sol
9fc897b5beaa451a98ce4d1e5680763926f544b92285835744749cccd6c284abb ./ftso/lib/FtsoEpoch.sol
610f6e35ef8d0f7635546da682e0b85066f6d7da531e42b521550a8823143feb ./ftso/lib/FtsoManagerSettings.sol
bfd7ff3cd9a85464aef72a352738d125aa8ccc44b01151177f500f45824b24e1 ./ftso/interface/IIIFTsoManager.sol
7453e1b5f1ff09150633a05d0d3f3933b305e36726dce6dff3fad90cf34e05c ./ftso/interface/IIIFTso.sol
c5cdbcfd3da71c72202233f06c0cfcd484adb064add6b467a8e281812ba13d9a ./ftso/interface/IIIFTsoManagerV1.sol
795ed7e1637f23eacf1a80da16aa2eb4785e65d2f9cac0c4d89a6b3f651fa9bf ./token/mock/VPTokenMock.sol
f9a26c45723f7222eb7fb92c03559b23f20393559b0a3a4be2bcb552f189757a ./token/mock/DummyVPToken.sol
dce2c78c18163d8540271e4a4b74cafe680e80f8ac853442a81d847b7b5090c5 ./token/mock/TransferToWhatMock.sol
4c94b4f56760904663535fd042148691e5736ceaae8e87fcdf59bd2f1cb5b19c ./token/mock/FlashLoanMock.sol
841498726cdf0115b452fc8f35a657a6ee2d21a1e775a88ee7ea7f733b933ff ./token/mock/CheckPointsByAddressMock.sol
cea31e015368633710f9857b298c7f1a6ecfee141c2a30c4cd5cdf2d8e98e532 ./token/mock/PercentageDelegationMock.sol
666fe341bf00a5f0e28d7d339581e899ad0117fc095f99bd6d6d3c7b3a5940 ./token/mock/CheckPointHistoryMock.sol
9f9022acb627b70ba075e57bb1aa978bbc3b4d07ceb97e2acf075294ade41 ./token/mock/VotePowerMock.sol
8a06b88a399e75a55a404fb8fbcc970db8643f6b47a5ce4ab24a306dc1eb4d3c ./token/mock/ExplicitDelegationMock.sol
4246d9082408e18033c1d2d5d6776242878a4cdeca24c696d7d7e787a8f7a8ec ./token/mock/VPContractMock.sol
85476a88d03782f81331edbd527513f70b2d887222f68339d66fd7729d057 ./token/mock/DelegatableMock.sol
91bdd63882161447718359c99cff1c6974d35d36ee51fb5a017066ee835b5c86 ./token/mock/CheckPointableMock.sol
cdf463a2c26f7245f3678565cb1275a5ffef633fa329e19c1e84e6af333d853 ./token/implementation/CheckPointable.sol
04a3bc74d57bbf9ab84cabfa308b8381bd225db7a210a579f01319e6a3f89fff ./token/implementation/VPToken.sol
5003b4781ad9ad55718dbb6607ec6691078a8994779c15cf507fec52565e4a7e ./token/implementation/Delegatable.sol
aff920a71e29771dab9fedbd55614b303a21aa81b9bd2fc9a2fd0c3e3ca3426b ./token/implementation/WNat.sol
6b18c3c39097c659979825df30f912e80f4e9bd518e0b8b149d0ed8b4836c1dc ./token/implementation/CleanupBlockNumberManager.sol
23f612bdabff273dbff98deadce84f9fba7e3f2ab31c6804484f2a6904200c ./token/implementation/VPContract.sol
53aa232b7f50bb17d650419207735c18c7e90bddebef074bc80e240c1442d01 ./token/lib/DelegationHistory.sol
79609b62af94c15d89b94676d4514396e8a8c165c9e870e099996b3a0488d63 ./token/lib/CheckPointHistoryCache.sol
7c7858e64134e57a5649b54e5e04153f448d346e246b84923d4339c4fb576751f ./token/lib/ExplicitDelegation.sol
82da0011307842f905d1b3809457ad58a0e869b7c0590a2edab9f6011e1f3c35 ./token/lib/PercentageDelegation.sol

```

```
ed07ecbf063aafb852b4e67baf68d7a02485144db31ed37765cdab9b9e2396bf ./token/lib/VotePowerCache.sol
8ec06551b24efb1a3aef75ec0af76ecalf2845bad71eeafadd71ed514c0ab116 ./token/lib/VotePower.sol
8b964e7efa5b4ddba69251fb8b455f65964ed187f82707ff7adc089ed41f8e6 ./token/lib/CheckPointsByAddress.sol
10f17a1c451bc43f55ba0a8a81a9a213dc1df6ec2bb7200cc21d13f422ed34dd ./token/lib/CheckPointHistory.sol
63856382a0837b1e219b5f5e49a402a90877d1e4b9d3469ade5add2613fd4b8a ./token/interface/IICleanable.sol
ad7bd71fb0f01dea138ff1fb0213100248873450301a2ad674285ba8cf56b05d ./token/interface/IIGovernanceVotePower.sol
c3f1fdbd8e3b1c298552586f4c07fc1bdd28c45d1d30dd765c3c0443afab3ca6 ./token/interface/IIVPContract.sol
37d9c059841c5c00853b6407ccb82cd15a8d5e144e7a0ecc039c7f818c0cc94 ./token/interface/IIVPToken.sol
```

The following documentation was consulted during this engagement:

1. Flare design review presentation prepared by Flare's team
2. The Flare Network and Spark Token whitepaper [flare\\_v1.1.pdf](#)
3. System specification documentation  
[https://gitlab.com/flarenetwork/flare-smart-contracts/-/tree/coinspect\\_audit2\\_branch2/docs/specs](https://gitlab.com/flarenetwork/flare-smart-contracts/-/tree/coinspect_audit2_branch2/docs/specs)
4. Flare Consensus Protocol [FCP.pdf](#)

The consensus protocol used in Flare network, the attacks that could arise because of its particularities and the design of the economic incentives or lack thereof were not in scope for this audit.

This audit focused on several smart contracts that implement system critical functionality for the Flare Network such as:

- Token contracts
- Flare Daemon, a special system trigger contract.
- Flare Inflation tracking and allocation.
- Reward manager and distribution to rewarded services
- Supply accounting system of FLR tokens
- Vote Power (delegation mechanisms and revocation)
- FTSO (Flare Time Series Oracles)
- FTSO Manager
- Price providers and the whitelisting process

A detailed explanation of how these components work and interact can be found in Flare Network's [website](#) and project repository and the material listed above in this report.

The system's specifications include attack scenarios and how they were contemplated and mitigated and the rationale behind several choices made for the implementation.

The smart contracts are specified to be compiled with Solidity compiler version 0.7.6. The repository includes a comprehensive set of unit and integration tests. The code coverage obtained is excellent, except from one contract that is part of a new feature that is being developed (`StateConnector.sol`). Also, the code repository includes a set of fuzzers that test tokens behavior and price providers and their voting power as a random sequence of protocol actions occur.

The contracts are designed to be upgradable, and most of their parameters can be reconfigured after deployment by a special Governance address controlled by the Flare Foundation. The Governance mechanism responsible for setting these parameters, and as a result controlling the platform and its funds, was not evaluated by Coinspect.

During this engagement, several potential attack scenarios were considered and evaluated by reading the code and writing tests, including:

- Pseudo random number generation and utilization
- Potential issues with vote power delegation
- Revocation of vote power delegated in the past and its related cached view
- Price providers collusion to manipulate prices
- Price providers collusion to unfairly accumulate rewards
- Transactions replay and the commit/reveal scheme used to submit prices to oracles
- Accounting of balances maintained by the system contracts
- Bypassing inflation and supply token minting limits
- Data structures and gas utilization abuse

For this audit, Coinspect auditors assumed the security properties granted by the Flare Network consensus layer behaved as described in the whitepaper. More specifically reorganizations and the manipulation of transaction ordering were considered impossible. It is advised to consider the possibility of attacks relying on protocol related time windows and how they could be manipulated. For example: would it be possible to spam the network with enough transactions right before the

reveal period starts in order to force the commit transactions out of the time window, censoring late submissions in order to manipulate the prices? (this could be facilitated by the price providers' late submission pattern as observed in Flare monitoring tools). The profitability of such an attack would depend on the value of the costs being protected by the FTSO oracles and this was outside the scope for this engagement.

Even though the cryptoeconomics and incentives mechanisms were not evaluated during this engagement, which focused on the implementation correctness, some high-level concerns were identified during the code review in relation to oracle manipulation, price provider collusion scenarios, and incentives alignment and were discussed with Flare's team. These potential issues depend on other components of the platform which are currently being developed and will be considered by the Flare team and it is recommended they are reviewed once the implementation is complete.

It is worth noting that several protection mechanisms are implemented in the platform, including but not limited to: configurable parameters (e.g., maximum allowed price deviation), monitoring infrastructure and fallback to trusted addresses. Most of these mechanisms depend on the ability of external observers and off-chain components to identify behaviors and react in a prompt manner.

Regarding the oracle consumers, Coinspect recommends adding the ability to obtain the epoch finalization type besides the current price and timestamp from a FTSO oracle `getCurrentPrice` function in order to allow the clients to make decisions based on how the price was calculated (e.g., fallback mode, price copied from previous epoch) without requiring them to listen to the blockchain events.

### 3. Fix Review

The Fix Review started on **March 24, 2022** and was conducted over the files located at the [coinspect\\_audit2\\_branch2](#) GitLab repository, which was [merged](#) on **March 15, 2022**, as of commit `42ff03c74f10f816e606d02f2fb6b741a3400195`. The files have the following sha256sum hash:

```
bf4e539e6ec09b9d9472efa79923b4a7d7232cc5f119206c74d52d6ae841dccf ./tokenPools/implementation/FtsoRewardManager.sol  
68e536215e580bc0073a401087a09f0921f2a75c9c62e7295ca1803cf31506f1 ./tokenPools/implementation/UnearnedRewardBurner.sol  
a0e52c0e5cc716c4aa158b2d0b6d9d48726858139f847228faa38f6d9c3366f3 ./tokenPools/implementation/Distribution.sol  
8cea4c20f387577b2cea18c134cf8520b3e022184f33c84eb7cf54084919e937 ./tokenPools/interface/IITokenPool.sol
```



```

7453e1b5f1ff09150633a05d0d3f3933b0305e36726dce6dff3fad90cf34e05c ./.ftso/interface/IIIFTso.sol
c5cdbfd3da71c72202233f06c0fcfd484adb064add6b467a8e281812ba13ad9a ./.ftso/interface/IIIFTsoManagerV1.sol
795ed7e1637f23eacf1a80da16aa2eb4785e65d2f9cac0c4d89a6b3f651fa9bf ./.token/mock/VPTokenMock.sol
f9a26c45723f7222eb7fb92c03559b23f20393559b0a3a4be2bc552f189757a ./.token/mock/DummyVPToken.sol
dce2c78c18163d8540271e4a4b74cafe680e80f8ac853442a81d847b7b5099c5 ./.token/mock/TransferToWhaleMock.sol
4c94b4f56769094663535fd042148691e5736ceaea8e87fcdf59bd2f1cb5b919c ./.token/mock/FlashLoanMock.sol
841498726cdf0115b452fc8f35a657a6ee2d21a1e775a88ee7ea7f733b9b33ff ./.token/mock/CheckPointsByAddressMock.sol
cea31e015368633710f9857b298c7f1a6ecfee141c2a30c4cd5cdf2d8e98e532 ./.token/mock/PercentageDelegationMock.sol
666fe341bf00a5f0e287d7d339581e89adb117fc095f99bd66d7dc37b3a5940 ./.token/mock/CheckPointHistoryMock.sol
9f9022acd627b70ba075e57bb1aa978bbc3b4d07ceb9be7eacf075294a4e41 ./.token/mock/VotePowerMock.sol
8a06b88a399e75a55a404fb8fbc970db8643f6b47a5ce4ab24a306dc1eb4d3c ./.token/mock/ExplicitDelegationMock.sol
4246d9082408e18033c1d2d5d6776242878a4cdeca24c696dd7e787a8f7faec ./.token/mock/VPContractMock.sol
85476a8b8d03782f81331edbd5527513f70b2d887222f68339d66fd7729d907 ./.token/mock/DelegatableMock.sol
91bdd6388216144771835c9ccff1c6974d35d36ee5d1fb5a01706eee835b6c86 ./.token/mock/CheckPointableMock.sol
cdf463a2c26f7245f3678565cb1275a5fffffd633fa329e19c1e84e6af333d853 ./.token/implementation/CheckPointable.sol
04a3bc74d57bbf9ab84cabfa30808381db225db7a210a579f01319e6a3f89fff ./.token/implementation/VPToken.sol
5003b4781ad9ad55718dbe6607ec6691078a8994779c15cf507fec52565e4a7e ./.token/implementation/Delegatable.sol
aff920a71e29771dab9fedbd55614b303a21aa81b9bd2fe9a2fd0c3e3ca3426b ./.token/implementation/WNat.sol
6b18c3c39097c659979825df30f912e80f4e9bd518e0b80149d0ed8b4836c1dc ./.token/implementation/CleanupBlockNumberManager.sol
23f612bdabff273dbff98deadce84fe9fb7e3f2ab31c5804484f2a6904200c ./.token/implementation/VPContract.sol
53aa232b7f50bb17d650419207735c18c7e90bdddbe0f74bc80e240c1442d01 ./.token/lib/DelegationHistory.sol
796d9b62a94c15d89b94676d4514396e8a8c165c9e870e009996b3a0488cd63 ./.token/lib/CheckPointHistoryCache.sol
7c7858e64134e57a649b54e5e04153f448d346e246b84923d4339c4fb576751f ./.token/lib/ExplicitDelegation.sol
82da0011307842f905d1b3809457ad58a0e869b7c0590a2edab9f6011e1f3c35 ./.token/lib/PercentageDelegation.sol
ed07ecbf063aafb852b4e67ba68d7a02485144db31ed37765cabb9b9e2396bf ./.token/lib/VotePowerCache.sol
8ec06551b24efb1a3aeef75ec0af76ecalf2845bad71eefafdd71ed514c0ab116 ./.token/lib/VotePower.sol
8b964e7efa5b4ddb469251fb8b455f65964ed187f82707ff7eadc089ed41f8e6 ./.token/lib/CheckPointsByAddress.sol
10f17a1c451bc43f55b0a0a8a81a9a213dc1df6ec2bb7200cc21d13f422ed34dd ./.token/lib/CheckPointHistory.sol
63856382a0837b1e219b5f5e49a402a90877d1e4ab9d3469ade5add2613fd4b8a ./.token/interface/IIICleanable.sol
ad7bd71fb0f01dea138ff1fb0213100248873450301a2ad674285ba8cf56b05d ./.token/interface/IIIGovernanceVotePower.sol
c3f1fdbd8e3b1c298552586f4c07fc1bd28c45d1d30d765c3c0443afab3c6 ./.token/interface/IIIVPContract.sol
37d9c059841c5c00853b6407ccb82cd15a8d5e144e7a0ecc039c7f818c0ccd94 ./.token/interface/IIIVPToken.sol

```

## 4. Summary of Finding

Id	Title	Total Risk	Fixed
FLR-6	Reward burner can be reconfigured to send funds to arbitrary account	Info	✓
FLR-7	priceDeviationThresholdBIPS can't adapt to market conditions	Info	✓
FLR-8	totalSelfDestructWithdrawnWei variable is never updated	Info	✓
FLR-9	Inflation annum tests not passing	Info	✓

## 5. Detailed Findings

FLR-6	Reward burner can be reconfigured to send funds to arbitrary account
Total Risk <b>Info</b>	Impact -
Fixed 	Likelihood -

### Description

The `UnearnedRewardBurner` contract is intended to burn funds that are transferred to it. This is performed via the `selfdestruct` mechanism. However, the destination address passed to `selfdestruct` is configurable, and as a result the funds could end up not being effectively burned but being sent to an address controlled by Governance.

```
function _burnUnearnedRewards() internal {
    // Are there any rewards to burn?
    uint256 rewardsToBurnWei = totalUnearnedWei.add(totalExpiredWei).sub(totalBurnedWei);

    if (rewardsToBurnWei > 0) {
        // Calculate max rewards that can be burned
        uint256 maxToBurnWei = address(this).balance.mulDiv(MAX_BURNABLE_PCT, 100);

        uint256 toBurnWei = 0;
        // Calculate what we will burn
        if (rewardsToBurnWei > maxToBurnWei) {
            toBurnWei = maxToBurnWei;
        } else {
            toBurnWei = rewardsToBurnWei;
        }

        // Any to burn?
        if (toBurnWei > 0) {
            // Get the burn address; make it payable
            address payable burnAddress = payable(supply.burnAddress());

            // Accumulate what we are about to burn
            totalBurnedWei = totalBurnedWei.add(toBurnWei);
        }
    }
}
```

```
// Update lastBalance before transfer, to avoid reentrancy warning
lastBalance = lastBalance.sub(toBurnWei);

// Burn baby burn
UnearnedRewardBurner unearnedRewardBurner = new
    UnearnedRewardBurner(burnAddress);
//slither-disable-next-line arbitrary-send
address(unearnedRewardBurner).transfer(toBurnWei);
unearnedRewardBurner.die();

// Emit event to signal what we did
emit RewardsBurned(toBurnWei);
}

}

}

}
```

The target burnAddress is obtained from the Supply contract, which allows Governance to modify the address at will:

```
/**
 * @notice Change burn address
 * @param _burnAddress          New burn address
 * @dev Updates burn value for current address, changes to new address and updates again
 */
function changeBurnAddress(address _burnAddress) external onlyGovernance {
    _updateCirculatingSupply();
    burnAddressBalance = 0;
    burnAddress = _burnAddress;
    _updateBurnAddressAmount();
}
```

## Recommendation

Consider removing the ability to change the destination address of the funds sent to the reward burner contract. Alternatively, document it is possible for Governance to configure the protocol to send the funds to any account instead of burning them as suggested by the contract name.

## Status

This issue was addressed in commit [f66b9a5af48ce46e4d2fbbe4e80a29cea93b20fc](#).

**FLR-7**
**priceDeviationThresholdBIPS** can't adapt to market conditions

Total Risk

Impact

Location

**Info****Ftso.sol**

Fixed

Likelihood

-



## Description

The `priceDeviationThresholdBIPS` storage variable is immutable. As a consequence, it would require redeploying the contract to modify this parameter in order to allow the platform to react to potentially quick market changes.

```
// storage
uint256 public immutable priceDeviationThresholdBIPS;
// threshold for price deviation between consecutive epochs
```

The variable is set by the contract constructor and is utilized by the protection mechanism that prevents the oracle price from moving too fast and triggers the fallback mechanism.

For that reason it would be ideal if the variable can be easily modified in order to adapt to a changing market context without the cost of redeploying the contract.

## Recommendation

Consider making this variable configurable by governance.

## Status

Flare confirmed that the `priceDeviationThresholdBIPS` value is updated by re-deploying the FTSO contract and replacing it.

**FLR-8**
**totalSelfDestructWithdrawnWei** variable is never updated

Total Risk	Impact -	Location <b>Inflation.sol</b>
<b>Info</b>	Likelihood -	

Fixed ✓

## Description

The `totalSelfDestructWithdrawnWei` storage variable is never updated and remains uninitialized. However, it is used by two functions, for example:

```
function getExpectedBalance() private view returns(uint256 _balanceExpectedWei) {
    return inflationAnums.totalInflationTopupReceivedWei
        .sub(inflationAnums.totalInflationTopupWithdrawnWei)
        .add(totalSelfDestructReceivedWei)
        .sub(totalSelfDestructWithdrawnWei);
}
```

This issue does not currently represent a risk as the value is always 0.

This was observed in the `coinspect_audit2_branch1`, the variable does not exist in `coinspect_audit2_branch2` branch.

## Recommendation

Remove the unused variable.

## Status

The variable `totalSelfDestructWithdrawnWei` is not present in commit [42ff03c74f10f816e606d02f2fb6b741a3400195](#).

**FLR-9**
**Inflation annum tests not passing**

Total Risk	Impact	Location
	-	<b>Inflation.sol</b>
		<b>Info</b>
Fixed	Likelihood	
	-	
		✓

## Description

Coinspect observed two tests from the Inflation contract unit tests were not passing in the auditors test boxes. The tests yielded a different result when being executed in an isolated manner than when run as a part of the full test suite.

```

1) Contract: Inflation.sol; test/unit/inflation/implementation/Inflation.ts;
Inflation unit tests
  init
    Should initialize the annum:
    AssertionError: expected '366' to equal 365
      at Context.<anonymous>
    (test/unit/inflation/implementation/Inflation.ts:152:14)
      at runMicrotasks (<anonymous>)
      at processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:96:5)
2) Contract: Inflation.sol; test/unit/inflation/implementation/Inflation.ts;
Inflation unit tests
  recognize
    Should recognize new annum when year rolls over:
    AssertionError: expected 100000 to equal 200000
      + expected - actual
      -100000
      +200000

      at Context.<anonymous>
    (test/unit/inflation/implementation/Inflation.ts:186:14)
      at runMicrotasks (<anonymous>)
      at processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:96:5)

```

Upon consultation, the Flare team stated the tests were passing when executed from their automated build process.

These tests will be reviewed by the Flare team.

## Recommendation

Further investigate the tests to determine the failure root cause and fix them if necessary.

## Status

This issue was addressed in commit [81ab059a5189a5cec6b0babae7d9c31df3b4cbfa](#).

## 5. Disclaimer

The information presented in this document is provided “as is” and without warranty. Security Audits are a “point in time” analysis, and as such, it’s possible that something in scope may have changed since the tasks reflected in this report were executed. This report shouldn’t be considered a perfect representation of the risks threatening the analyzed systems and/or applications in scope.

## 6. About Coinspect

Coinspect is a boutique-style security consulting firm focused on Blockchain, Cryptocurrencies and Web3 technologies. Founded in 2014 by a team of information security professionals with currently +20 years of experience providing valuable and outstanding results to cutting-edge technology companies worldwide.

- Team of expert auditors (with +6y of experience in crypto / web3)
- Tailored service delivery to each client and their specific targets(s).
- Own manual security audit methodology (not a product/platform centric).
- Contributing to the community by publishing papers, techniques, and tools.

We have contributed to secure key technologies and services of the cryptocurrency ecosystem by auditing, reporting vulnerabilities, and proposing improvements for new blockchain (L1/L2) implementations, smart contracts, dApps, mobile apps, hardware wallets, compilers, developer tools, DeFi protocols, and exchanges.

### Delivering True Value to our Customers

- Lower Cost of Vulnerability Remediation; by delivering a detailed vulnerability report and included mitigation recheck services, our team will interact closely with Customers’ team and educate them on findings and recommendations.
- Increase Confidence and Expand Adoption; by providing a reliable technology from a security standpoint the users will increase the circulating value in the platforms.
- Lessen Business Impact of Incidents; our state-of-the-art manual security assessment ensures that any potential threats are identified and addressed quickly and effectively, minimizing the business impact of incidents.

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